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How Following Regulatory Guidance Can Increase Auditors’ Litigation Risk Exposure 
 
Abstract: This study investigates how following explicit regulatory guidance can result, 
unintentionally, in increased litigation risk exposure for auditors. We do so by examining the unique 
and specific context where the PCAOB directly instructs auditors how to apply professional judgment 
- to rely on a client’s competent and objective internal audit function (IAF) during multi-location 
audits. Consistent with theoretical predictions based on numerosity heuristic processing and norm 
theory, we find that holding all other factors constant, following explicit regulatory advice not only 
fails to limit auditors’ litigation risk but can actually increase jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence. 
Because the numerosity heuristic leads jurors to believe that there is a higher likelihood of misstatement 
on multi-location compared to single location audits, jurors perceive that auditor reliance on the IAF 
during multi-location audits is not normal. Accordingly, they judge auditors to be more negligent when 
they rely on the IAF in multi-location audits than when they do not, but IAF reliance does not impact 
negligence assessments on single location audits. Our results suggest auditor reluctance to use a 
qualified IAF, despite client and regulatory pressure, can be a rational and defensible strategy to limit 
their litigation risk exposure. 
  
1 
 
How Following Regulatory Guidance Can Increase Auditors’ Litigation Risk Exposure 
 
I. Introduction 
We examine whether following explicit regulatory directives can have the unintended 
consequence of increasing auditors’ litigation risk exposure. We do so by focusing on the auditor’s 
reliance on the client’s internal audit function (IAF) during multi-location financial statement audits, 
which is explicitly encouraged by the Public Company Auditing Oversight Board (PCAOB) (PCAOB 
2007a). Audit litigation is a key operating cost for U.S. public accounting firms and the related risk 
exposure costs are estimated to be 15.1 percent of overall audit revenue (U.S. Treasury 2008).  Further, 
during the period 1995 – 2007, the six largest accounting firms paid more than $5 billion to settle in 
excess of 360 litigation related cases (U.S. Treasury 2008; Donelson 2013). Litigation risk exposure 
can negatively impact auditors’ reputation and business risk (Shu 2000). Thus, auditors adopt proactive 
and reactive strategies to manage their legal and reputation risks, such as shedding risky clients (Shu 
2000) and enforcing more conservative financial reporting (Lennox and Li 2014; Center for Audit 
Quality 2015).  
Auditors are not required to use their client’s IAF, as there are both positive and negative 
considerations associated with doing so. Clients pressure auditors to rely on their IAF because they see 
it as an opportunity to achieve lower audit fees.1 An effective IAF is an important component of high 
quality corporate governance (e.g., Treadway Commission 1987; Hermanson and Rittenberg 2003; 
Prawitt, Smith, and Wood 2009) likely because the IAF has significant company-specific knowledge 
and performs compliance and operational audits (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, and Bardhan 2011). Further, 
objective and competent IAF teams who serve as direct assistants on audit engagements can improve 
                                                             
1 Auditors can elect to rely on the client’s IAF in two ways: 1) direct assistants - where the IAF staff members support 
the audit team by performing procedures that are reviewed and approved steps in the auditor’s audit program and, 2) 
work paper review – the auditor’s use of the results of IAF testing to reduce the nature and extent of the auditor’s own 
tests. This study focuses on auditor reliance on the IAF as direct assistants and where the IAF staff is directly employed 
by the client (i.e., the IAF is not an out-sourced operation). 
2 
 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial statement audit (e.g., PCAOB 2005, 2007b; Schneider 
2009; Lin et al. 2011). Thus, satisfying client wishes to use their IAF would seem to be an easy 
decision. Yet, despite the PCAOB’s encouragement, auditors still seem reluctant to use their client’s 
IAF. Cohn (2011) notes that auditors tend to use the IAF only when pressed to do so by client 
management. Similarly, observers at the 2014 joint Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) and Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA) roundtable noted that auditors’ reluctance to rely on their client’s IAF has 
“caused resentment between our teams” (CAQ and IIA 2015). Auditors’ reluctance to rely on their 
client’s IAF might be a part of a deliberate strategy to manage their litigation risk among other reasons 
such as audit fee considerations (Felix, Gramling, and Maletta 2001) or IAF objectivity concerns 
(DeZoort, Houston, and Peters 2001).   
The PCAOB chides auditors for both not using the IAF enough (PCAOB 2007b), and for over 
relying on the IAF for high risk areas (PCAOB 2013). One area where the PCAOB has urged use of 
the IAF is on multi-location audits (audits of clients with more than one unit, subsidiary or affiliate at 
more than one geographic location).2 More specifically, conditioned on maintaining audit 
effectiveness, auditing standards call for increased utilization of the client’s IAF as a way to improve 
audit efficiency (Auditing Standard [AS] No. 2201, PCAOB 2007a; Statement on Auditing Standards 
[SAS] No. 128, AICPA 2014; International Standards on Auditing [ISA] No. 610, International 
Federation of Accountants [IFAC] 2013; Canadian Auditing Standard [CAS] No. 610, Chartered 
Professional Accountants of Canada [CPAC] 2013).3 When implementing AS No. 2201, the PCAOB 
                                                             
2 AS No. 2201 (p. 63) is the unique case where the PCAOB explicitly encourages auditors to place reliance on the 
client’s IAF for audit testing in multiple location settings: “For example, if the internal auditors' planned procedures 
include relevant audit work at various locations, the auditor may coordinate work with the internal auditors and reduce 
the number of locations or business units at which the auditor would otherwise need to perform auditing procedures.” 
3 SAS No. 128 (AICPA 2014), AS No. 2605 (PCAOB 2003), ISA 610 (IFAC 2013), and CAS 610 (CPAC 2013) 
govern auditors’ use of the client’s IAF. These standards assert that auditors must first assess the objectivity, 
competence, and quality control system of the IAF, as well as the IAF’s audit approach. After auditors determine that 
the IAF meets the quality standard, they can rely on the client’s IAF for testing only when the risk of a misstatement 
in the account area being tested is low, and the degree of subjectivity in the calculation of the amounts being tested is 
low (PCAOB 2007a; IFAC 2013; CPAC 2013; e.g., low complexity inventory testing). The standards also indicate 
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alerted auditors that their inspections would assess audit efficiency and specifically encouraged 
auditors’ use of the IAF as a way to enhance efficiency (without compromising effectiveness; PCAOB 
2006).   
Auditing standards guide auditors to rely on the IAF in areas where there is a low risk of 
misstatement and explicitly state that multi-location environments can qualify as low risk contexts 
where auditors could rely on the IAF for inventory testing (PCAOB 2007a; AICPA 2014).  This 
suggests that auditors who rely on their client’s IAF in a low risk multi-location context would be 
managing their litigation risk exposure effectively.  But earlier audit litigation research suggests this 
might not be the case. For example, mere compliance with standards does not necessarily limit auditor 
legal liability (Kadous 2000; Reffett 2010; Maksymov and Nelson 2017). Thus, although auditors 
might be taking actions that are explicitly encouraged by regulators, jurors tasked with determining 
legal liability could perceive an increased risk of misstatement for multi-location versus single location 
audits even if the actual risk of misstatement is equivalent for the two types of audits and auditors acted 
appropriately to address the audit risk. We focus our study on examining this context.  
Individuals in the general population (the pool from which jurors are selected) experience 
difficulty processing and integrating numeric and risk data which leads them to rely on a numerosity 
heuristic when processing numeric information (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Pelham, Sumarta and 
Myaskovsky 1994). The numerosity heuristic refers to the tendency to judge probability by inferring 
greater likelihood from larger numbers without regard to unit size because it is cognitively easier for 
individuals to process absolute numbers rather than relationships between numbers (e.g., Pelham et al. 
1994). Developing theory from the numerosity heuristic, we predict that jurors will assess a higher 
likelihood of material misstatement on a multi-location than a single-location audit simply because the 
                                                             
that auditors can rely on the client’s IAF for internal controls and substantive testing in inventory settings (PCAOB 
2007a; IFAC 2013; CPAC 2013).  
4 
 
number of locations will have a stronger effect on the perceived risk of misstatement than the base rate 
probability of misstatement at any location. We also apply research on norm theory to predict that 
jurors’ perceptions of higher misstatement risk in multi-location than single-location audits will lead 
them to believe it is more abnormal for auditors to rely on the IAF in the multi-location versus single-
location audit engagement (Kahneman and Miller 1986). Norm theory holds that decision makers (e.g., 
jurors) will assess stronger causal links and assign greater blame when there are negative outcomes in 
perceived abnormal events (Kahneman and Miller 1986; Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002). 
Accordingly, we expect that, given an audit failure, jurors will assign increased auditor negligence 
when auditors rely on the IAF in the multi-location but not single-location audit setting.  
We address our research questions in an experiment using jury eligible participants.4 The 
design manipulates the extremes of audit locations (single versus multiple) and extent of auditor 
reliance on the IAF (rely versus not rely) while holding constant IAF quality, a low actual (stated) 
account balance misstatement risk, a low degree of subjectivity in the account balance, and a high 
severity of shareholder loss. We focus on auditors’ reliance on the IAF where the IAF staff provides 
direct assistance to the auditor. In this form of IAF reliance, auditors create the audit work plan, 
supervise and sign off on the test work performed by the client’s IAF staff. Thus, we examine the less 
risky of the two options of auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF permissible under the standards.5  
The experimental approach allows for key advantages – for example, we employ random 
assignment and manipulate only the two constructs of interest (number of locations and auditor’s IAF 
reliance) while holding constant factors that can co-occur with the two constructs of interest (Cook and 
                                                             
4 While the majority of auditor litigation cases are resolved before trial, researchers focus on juror judgment because 
attorneys’ decisions about settlements are largely influenced by the expected trial outcome (Maksymov, Pickerd, 
Lowe, Peecher, and Reffett 2017). For example, Maksymov et al. (2017) report that experienced audit litigation 
attorneys routinely use mock juror verdicts and decision making to inform their settlement approach and strategy. 
5 When auditors rely on the IAF’s work performed as part of the IAF’s audit plan, there is less scrutiny and control 
over the IAF’s audit quality, which results in higher risk to the auditor. 
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Campbell 1979; Bonner 2008; Kadous and Zhou 2017). Through a pre-test lottery on the full sample, 
we demonstrate that participants, regardless of treatment group, are equally susceptible to the 
numerosity heuristic.6 Therefore we can rule out the alternative explanation that the numerosity 
heuristic effect observed in this study exists only for participants in the multi-location treatment groups. 
The experimental approach allows us to disentangle auditors’ litigation risk exposure arising from 
multi-location audits versus the cognitive effects of reliance on the IAF in the multi-location audit.  In 
the real world, multi-location audits are often associated with increased audit risk because the various 
locations have heterogeneous operations and processes, and vary in their impact on audit materiality 
(e.g., Allen, Loebbecke, and Sorensen 1998). Our experimental design controls for these factors and 
incorporates cues that maintain a constant risk of misstatement across the two levels of audit locations 
varied. Importantly, an expert panel (audit partners, executive directors, and senior managers at 
multinational audit firms) reviewed the case materials and confirmed that auditors would consider the 
risk of material misstatement to be equivalent across the two location conditions. 
Consistent with our expectations based on numerosity heuristic theory, jurors assess a higher 
likelihood of misstatement in the multi-location compared to the single location audit setting. These 
risk assessments lead jurors to judge auditors as more negligent when they rely on the client’s IAF in 
the multi-location setting than when they do not. However, the level of auditor reliance on the client’s 
IAF does not impact auditor negligence in the single location setting.  Mediation analyses indicate that 
jurors’ perception of misstatement risk in the audit influences their beliefs about when auditors’ 
reliance on the IAF is normal, prudent behavior, and together, these factors mediate jurors’ decisions.   
Auditor litigation risk is a persistent problem that requires constant management by audit firm 
leaders, and understanding auditor liability factors remains an important research topic (Levitt and 
                                                             
6 We elaborate on the pre-test lottery in sections III and IV.   
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Nicolaisen 2008; Kadous and Mercer 2012; Grenier, Lowe, Reffett, and Warne 2015; Brasel, Doxey, 
Grenier, and Reffett 2016; Maksymov and Nelson 2017; Maksymov, Pickerd, Lowe, Peecher, and 
Reffett 2017). The prior literature demonstrates that juror’s liability judgments often ignore steps 
auditors take to enhance audit quality or that appear to be consistent with audit guidance (e.g., Kadous 
2000; Lowe, Reckers and Whitecotton 2002; Reffett 2010; Grenier, Pomeroy, and Stern 2015; Backof 
2015; Gimbar, Hansen and Ozlanski 2016; Maksymov and Nelson 2017; Maksymov et al. 2017). We 
provide evidence that going beyond what is implied by or consistent with audit standards, even 
auditors’ actions that are explicitly encouraged by an audit regulator, can not only fail to mitigate their 
legal liability, but can actually escalate auditors’ litigation risk. Importantly too, our finding is obtained 
even in the context of a low risk of misstatement. Thus, in some instances, the legal regime can 
undermine its governance mechanism role and thwart one of its key objectives of incentivizing auditors 
to take steps to enhance audit quality. 
Our test of the negative (unintended) consequence of auditor’s reliance on the client’s IAF is 
conservative because we consider auditor reliance on the IAF in the form of direct supervision, the less 
risky of the two options of auditor reliance on the IAF. Arguably, if auditors face increased litigation 
risk when following explicit regulatory urgings, even in low misstatement risk and low IAF reliance 
risk scenarios, then their liability likely escalates as these risks increase. More generally, our findings 
that numerosity heuristic and norm theory cognitive processing influence juror decision making has 
implications for other audit contexts. Potentially, auditors could be at risk of having evaluators focus 
on the sample size or the number of attributes that they selected for testing rather than other aspects of 
the account that the auditor deemed more relevant. Relatedly, other governance agents such as 
regulatory and peer inspectors might be susceptible to numerosity heuristic and norm theory cognitive 
processing when they judge audit quality, consistent with Reyna and Adam’s (2003) finding that 
knowledgeable professionals are also prone to numerosity heuristic processing.  
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II. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Studies in auditor litigation provide insights into jurors’ consideration of auditing standards 
when they assess auditors’ legal liability. One of the first such studies, Kadous (2000), demonstrates 
that jurors make retrospective evaluations of auditors’ due care driven by the severity of the losses 
stemming from an audit failure rather than audit quality. Advancing knowledge of how jurors evaluate 
audit effort, Maksymov and Nelson (2017) demonstrate that jurors’ due care assessments depend on 
when they learn about the audit quality that had been applied on the audit. Relatedly, Lowe et al. (2002) 
show that reliance on some types of decision aids can hurt auditors during litigation proceedings. In a 
key development in the literature, Reffett (2010) finds that when the audit fails to detect fraud, audit 
teams that included fraud experts and had taken steps to enhance fraud detection actually faced higher 
legal liability than audit teams that expended less effort to detect fraud. More recently, Backof (2015) 
shows that enhanced documentation of alternative accounting approaches can increase auditors’ 
litigation risk exposure because the documentation increases jurors’ perceptions of the foreseeability 
of the misstatement. Likewise, Gimbar et al. (2016) document that enhanced disclosure of critical audit 
matters can increase auditors’ litigation risk, even though users and regulators profess to value 
increased disclosure in audited financial statements. In sum, the foregoing literature informs our 
understanding of how auditors’ conduct that appears to be consistent with or implied by the standards 
and the timing in informing jurors about the auditor’s conduct impacts jurors’ assessment of auditor 
negligence. This study extends the literature by examining how jurors evaluate auditors’ negligence 
when auditors’ actions directly follow explicit regulatory urgings.  
Auditor reliance on a client’s IAF can take two forms: 1) direct supervision of the IAF staff 
who perform audit program procedures as determined by the auditor and, 2) use of the results of IAF 
testing (e.g., work papers or procedures determined by the IAF) to reduce the nature and extent of the 
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auditor’s own work (see Bame-Aldred, Brandon, Messier Jr., Rittenberg, and Stefaniak 2013 for a 
review). When auditors rely on the results of IAF testing, they will test a sample of the IAF’s work. 
SAS No. 128 (AICPA 2014), ISA No. 610 (IFAC 2013), CAS No. 610 (CPAC 2013), and AS No. 
2605 (PCAOB 2003) govern auditors’ reliance on the IAF on a financial statement audit. The standards 
require that, before IAF reliance, auditors must first assess the objectivity and competence of the 
internal auditors, the IAF’s quality control system, and its application of a systematic and disciplined 
approach to conducting audits (AICPA 2014; CPAC 2013; IFAC 2013; PCAOB 2003). If these 
attributes are judged to be satisfactory, auditors can elect to rely on the client’s IAF in audit areas where 
there is a low risk of misstatement, and a low level of subjectivity associated with the account balance 
(CPAC 2013; IFAC 2013; PCAOB 2003). Auditors are encouraged to rely on the IAF to improve audit 
efficiency and effectiveness (IFAC 2012) and reduce the amount of testing on the internal controls 
over financial reporting and financial statement audits (PCAOB 2007a; PCAOB 2006). Research finds 
that reliance on the IAF can benefit auditors and clients. Felix et al. (2001) find an 18 percent reduction 
in audit fees when auditors rely on IAF work, while Pizzini, Lin, and Ziegenfuss (2015) report the use 
of the IAF positively impacts both efficiency and effectiveness of audit testing. Based on these findings 
that IAF reliance can benefit both auditors and clients, and regulators encourage auditors to use the 
IAF within audit effectiveness constraints, we investigate how jurors assess auditor negligence when 
they rely on the client’s IAF in low risk accounts. Below, we develop our hypotheses informed by 
findings from numerosity heuristic processing and norm theory. 
Juror Perceptions of Account Balance Misstatement Risk 
Individuals have difficulty processing and interpreting numeric data (e.g., Nisbett and Ross 
1980; Nayak and Prabhala 2001; Burson, Larrick and Lynch 2009; Pandelaere, Briers and Lembregts 
2011; Monga and Bagchi 2011), and understanding numeric risk estimates (Yamagishi 1997; Lipkus, 
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Samsa, and Rimer 2001; Bonner and Newell 2008).7  Research in numerosity heuristic processing 
suggests that difficulty evaluating relationships between numbers (Pelham et al. 1994; Pinto-Prades, 
Martinex-Perez, and Abellan-Perpinan 2006) will influence jurors’ assessment of misstatement risk on 
multi-location audits.  Numerosity heuristic processing is the tendency to focus on the number of units 
into which the stimulus is divided while failing to consider the size of the units when judging likelihood 
and probabilities (Pelham et al. 1994).  Numerosity heuristic processing leads to focus on the absolute 
value of the numerator while ignoring the value of the denominator when evaluating proportions, and 
to overweighting the likelihood of the occurrence of an event when data are presented using larger 
absolute numbers (e.g., 100 out of 1,000) versus smaller absolute numbers (e.g., 10 out of 100) (Pinto-
Prades et al. 2006). In a game of chance where selecting a red bean is rewarded, Denes-Raj and 
Epstein’s (1994) participants preferred to choose from a bowl containing nine red and 91 blue beans 
(i.e., a 9 percent probability of winning) rather than from a bowl containing one red and nine blue beans 
(i.e., a 10 percent probability of winning). Noteworthy was that although participants indicated they 
were aware that choosing from the larger bowl was contrary to a rational choice, they, nonetheless, 
believed that more beans improved their chances (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). Pacini and Epstein 
(1999a) posit that numerosity heuristic processing occurs because it is cognitively easier to process 
absolute numbers (more concrete facts) and frequencies than it is to process ratios (facts about 
relationships between numbers).  
Relevant to the risk context of this study, numerosity heuristics research findings indicate that 
when evaluating risk-related information, individuals tend to overweight the numerator while ignoring 
the denominator (Yamagishi 1997; Bonner and Newell 2008). Individuals perceived that the mortality 
risk was higher when told that cancer kills 1,286 out of 10,000 people (12.86 percent risk) versus when 
                                                             
7 This difficulty is not correlated with general intelligence (Forrow, Taylor and Arnold 1992; Reyna and Adam 
2003). 
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told cancer kills 24.24 out of 100 people (24.24 percent risk) (Yamagishi 1997). They focused on the 
absolute value of the numerators (i.e., assessing “1,286” to be of greater risk than that of “24.24”) and 
did not consider the size of the units indicated by the denominators (“10,000” and “100,” respectively). 
Similarly, individuals perceived the risk of death was greater when told “36,500 people die from cancer 
every year” versus when told “100 people die from cancer every day” (Bonner and Newell 2008). 
Extrapolating numerosity heuristic processing to the audit litigation context, we expect that, ceteris 
paribus, jurors will focus on the number of locations and discount their relative size (proportion of 
account balance) when evaluating the risk of misstatement in a multiple-location versus a single-
location setting. Consequently, jurors will perceive a greater risk of misstatement when auditors 
evaluate multiple locations (without regard to the size implications – such as underlying dollar value 
of each of the locations) than when they evaluate one location.   
Applying these findings of how individuals process risk, probabilities and numeric data to the 
audit litigation setting, we expect that jurors exposed to a company with multiple audit locations will 
perceive that there is a higher likelihood of account misstatement than jurors who are exposed to a 
company with a single audit location (all else being equal).  Formally:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, jurors will assess an increased likelihood of an account misstatement when 
the audit client is a multi-location engagement than when the audit client is a single location 
engagement.   
 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2017) observe that there is mixed evidence supporting a connection 
between the factors associated with multi-location complexity and misstatement risk (i.e., financial 
reporting quality). While some studies find that companies with more reporting segments are 
associated with lower financial reporting quality (e.g., Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007), other studies do 
not find evidence to support this relationship (e.g., Cao, Myers, and Omer 2012). Accordingly, there 
is some tension as to whether even informed jurors would judge an increased likelihood of 
misstatement due to the number of client locations. As detailed later in Section III, our experimental 
11 
 
design holds constant, across treatment conditions, the multi-location factors that are associated with 
the risk of misstatement based on prior research including: company size, internal control quality, 
operating complexity and other client-specific differences that occur but cannot be disentangled in the 
natural environment. This study, therefore, extends the literature by offering the first direct evidence 
of how assessments of misstatement risk, driven by numerosity heuristic processing, are impacted 
when the number of locations is isolated. Importantly, Hypothesis 1 is a necessary condition for 
stimulating the norm theory cognitive processing posited in Hypothesis 2. Thus, Hypothesis 1 serves 
as a validation check to support an important tenet of our model (Bonner 2008) - that assessments of 
the likelihood of misstatement plays an integral role in the cognitive path of jurors’ auditor liability 
judgment. See Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Juror Perceptions of Auditor Legal Liability 
Our model of juror assessment of auditor litigation exposure provides that the joint effect of 
the number of audit locations and the auditor’s reliance on the IAF, along with jurors’ perceptions of 
the likelihood of misstatement together influence jurors’ judgments of normal auditor behavior. These 
juror judgments of what is normal will influence their beliefs about the (normalcy of) auditor’s conduct 
on the audit, which in turn, will guide their assessments of the auditor’s negligence and liability. Norm 
theory, a derivate of the availability and simulation heuristics (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1982), 
holds that individuals reason about events by employing a backward process from the experienced 
event to similarities with prior experienced events (Kahneman and Miller 1986). Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) find that perceptions of the normality of an event are determined retrospectively (after the event 
is experienced) and that people interpret and evaluate events by consulting remembered and 
constructed representations of how the event should have or could have unfolded.  Accordingly, when 
a constructed representation is consulted, events are evaluated by generating ad hoc counterfactual 
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alternatives rather than retrieving past experiences, where each event evokes its own frame of reference 
(Kahneman and Miller 1986; Reffett 2010; Donelson, Kadous, and McInnis 2014).  
Individuals perceive an event as normal (abnormal) when it conforms (does not conform) to 
remembered or constructed representations of how the event should unfold or when it evokes highly 
available counterfactual alternatives (Kahneman and Miller 1986; Reffett 2010; Donelson et al. 2014). 
When an event has a negative outcome, factors that trigger increased representations of alternatives 
tend to be attributed as causes and are assigned greater blame for the outcome (Kahneman and Miller 
1986; Gilovich et al. 2002; Reffett 2010; Backof 2015).  Additionally, it is easier to imagine someone 
not performing an act that was already completed than it is to imagine someone performing an act that 
was not completed (Kahneman and Tversky 1982).  As a result, actions taken during an evaluated 
event evoke stronger causal attributions than when such actions are not taken (Kahneman and Miller 
1986; Roese 1997; Reffett 2010).   
As a member of the public, the typical juror is generally unaware of auditing standards. As 
discussed above, auditing standards (e.g., AS No. 2201, AS No. 2605, ISA 610, CAS 610) permit 
auditor reliance on the IAF when the risk of misstatement is low and the IAF meets certain quality 
criteria, but requires that the “need for the auditor to perform his or her own work” increase as the risk 
of misstatement increases. When jurors receive instructions during trial proceedings, they are likely to 
interpret auditing standards to mean that when likelihood of a misstatement is lower, it is valid and 
normal for the auditors to rely on the client’s IAF. Consequently, when auditors behave in this 
“normal” manner, they will be perceived as fulfilling their audit responsibilities and are, therefore, less 
negligent.  However, when there is an increased likelihood of a misstatement, relying on the IAF will 
no longer be judged to be normal or prudent and the auditor will be judged as more negligent. Thus, 
juror’s perceptions of how normal it is for auditors to rely on a client’s IAF will depend on their 
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assessments of the likelihood of a misstatement and the perceived normality of auditors’ behavior and, 
together, will inform jurors’ evaluation of auditor negligence.    
In a single location audit setting where the perceived likelihood of misstatement is lower (H1), 
jurors will be more accepting of auditor reliance on the client’s IAF and interpret such reliance as a 
more normal event that is aligned with auditing standards and regulatory guidance. Given an audit 
failure, when the perceived likelihood of a misstatement is lower, juror assessments of auditor 
negligence are likely to be indifferent to whether the auditors relied or did not rely on the client’s IAF. 
There will be no difference in assessed auditor negligence when the likelihood of misstatement is 
perceived to be low because auditing standards allow IAF reliance, thus it is normal for auditors to 
either perform the work themselves or obtain assistance from the client’s IAF.  However, in the 
multiple audit location setting when the misstatement risk is perceived to be higher, jurors’ judgment 
will be influenced by the auditor’s reliance decision – they will judge auditors’ reliance on the client’s 
IAF as less normal/more abnormal and that auditors did not conform to audit guidance.  Accordingly, 
when there is audit failure, jurors will assess higher auditor negligence when the auditors rely versus 
do not rely on their client’s IAF.  Not relying on the client’s IAF in the multi-location audit setting will 
be perceived as a more normal event than relying on the client’s IAF.  Further, this perception will 
persist despite the fact that relying on the IAF can enhance audit efficiency, and potentially increase 
effectiveness (Pizzini et al. 2015).  Accordingly, we anticipate that in a multi-location audit setting, 
jurors’ negligence assessments will be higher when auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when they 
do not rely.  Formally: 
H2: Jurors’ assessments of auditors’ negligence will differ when auditors rely versus do not rely 
on the client’s IAF on multi-location audits but not on single location audits. Further, in a 
multi-location audit setting, auditors who rely on the client’s IAF will be judged as more 
negligent than auditors who do not rely on the client’s IAF.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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III. Task Description and Experimental Design 
Participants 
We recruited four hundred and forty-two participants for an online experiment via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk.8 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the participants. The average age was 
about 35 years old, 49 percent were male, 40 percent indicated that a Bachelor’s degree was the highest 
level of education, 2 percent had a doctorate degree, and 17 percent had investment experience.9     
Insert Table 1 about here 
Task Description and Experimental Procedures  
Participants served as prospective jurors on a hypothetical auditor liability trial.  Prior to 
receiving the case facts, participants completed a pre-experimental task to confirm that individuals in 
all conditions were, on average, susceptible to the numerosity heuristic, screened for U.S. juror 
eligibility, and received background education (on financial reporting and the roles of auditors) to 
evaluate the case.  Figure 3 presents a timeline of the experimental procedures.   
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Numerosity Heuristic Pre-test: We measured participants’ susceptibility to the numerosity 
heuristic processing using two lottery scenarios adapted from Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) (see 
Appendix A). In the first lottery, the odds of winning are presented as one in one hundred (1:100), 
while in the second lottery, the odds are presented as ten in one thousand (10:1,000). By design, the 
                                                             
8  Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-Phillips, and Vansant (2014), Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017), and Maksymov 
and Nelson (2017) note that Amazon Mechanical Turk is an appropriate source for studies like ours that require 
“non-sophisticated” participants. Further, Kadous (2000) and Kadous and Mercer (2012) find that individual juror 
judgments “are a reasonable proxy for jury decisions.” We configured settings in the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
application to bar pilot study participants from participating in this study. We also examined user IDs to confirm 
participants were unique and were not in the pilot. The approximate completion time was 25 minutes (same as 
observed in classroom pilot tests) and compensation was $2.  
9 Inferences from statistical analyses are unchanged when we control for demographic factors. 
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odds of winning are identical in the two lotteries in order to elicit whether participants fixate on the 
numerator. Participants were asked:    
1) “How would you advise Ralph [a friend] about which lottery, if either, would be more likely 
to produce a winning ticket?”  
2) “How do you think that the typical person would advise Ralph [a friend] about which lottery, 
if either, would be more likely to produce a winning ticket?”   
In response to each question, participants chose among the options: (a) the first lottery (1:100), (b) the 
second lottery (10: 1,000), or (c) no preference.     
Consistent with the established approach in the literature, we use the “others” prompt (i.e., 
what a typical person would do) to measure numerosity heuristic processing (e.g., Denes-Raj, Epstein, 
and Cole 1995; Alonso and Fernandez-Berrocal 2003; Pacini and Epstein 1999a, Pacini and Epstein 
1999b; Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994; Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992). Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole 
(1995) demonstrate that when asked about their own lottery choice, individuals exhibit weaker 
numerosity heuristic effects because they seek to preserve a rational self-presentation.  When asked to 
opine on how others would respond, however, such self-presentation concerns do not arise and 
individuals draw on their own reaction tendencies to estimate others’ reactions (Denes-Raj, Epstein, 
and Cole 1995; Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992; Pacini and Epstein 1999b; Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). 
Following prior studies (e.g., Pacini and Epstein 1999b), numerosity heuristic processing is measured 
by comparing the frequency of participants’ lottery choices (i.e., Lottery 1 versus 2) when giving 
personal advice versus the typical person giving advice. A significant departure from equal proportions 
when the typical person gives advice towards selecting option (b), the choice with the larger numerator, 
indicates the numerosity heuristic effect.  
Participant Qualification Pre-screening: Following the lottery, participants were screened for 
juror eligibility status (i.e., U.S. citizen, at least 18 years old, no felony convictions) and intellectual 
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competence based on three logic questions (two analogies and one number sequence). Individuals who 
failed any of these questions were dismissed from the study.   
Financial Reporting and Auditing Education: We expect that like the typical juror, the 
participants are not informed about common business practices (e.g., financial statements and 
auditors). Accordingly, eligible participants reviewed three sets of educational information about 
financial statement reporting and the external audit process, as well as background information about 
the company in the litigation case. At the end of each information set, participants responded to vetting 
questions (six in total) which verified that they understood the information presented.  Participants 
could only advance in the study after they had answered the education questions correctly. 
The first segment on financial statement education described information that is provided in 
financial statements, who uses them and how they can be used to gauge the financial health of a 
company.  The second segment described the role of external auditors, the audit process, and key audit 
concepts (e.g., definition of financial misstatements, materiality, audit opinions and reasonable 
assurance).  The third segment provided preliminary information about Big Time Gravel (the company 
that is the subject of the case) which noted that the company’s inventory consisted of granite stone and 
operationalization of the single versus multiple location manipulation of the inventory storage.  Before 
proceeding through the study, participants evaluated the likelihood that the company’s inventory 
balance could be misstated because it was important to capture the perceived likelihood of 
misstatement prior to participants learning that an actual misstatement was the basis of a litigation 
case.10  Subsequently, participants learned that Big Time Gravel has an IAF, which the auditors can 
choose to use to assist them (if risk of misstatement is low, degree of subjectivity of amounts tested is 
low and the IAF is judged to be competent and objective), that the auditors had deemed it appropriate 
                                                             
10 Participants’ perception of misstatement likelihood is captured before they proceed to the auditor litigation case 
facts because Kadous (2000) finds that jurors’ decisions are affected by knowledge of the defendant’s loss. Thus, it 
is important to measure perceptions of misstatement likelihood before jurors learn about the defendant’s loss.  
17 
 
for the IAF to assist them with inventory testing during the financial audit, and that the auditors 
reviewed all work performed on the audit before opining on the financial statements. 
Auditor Litigation Case:  The case, adapted from Kadous (2000, 2001) and Reffett (2010), 
involves a lawsuit between a bank (the plaintiff) and an audit firm (the defendant).  The case facts 
reveal that the audit firm (defendant) had issued a clean audit opinion on Big Time’s financial 
statements, but a year later it was uncovered that the inventory balance was materially overstated.  
Following the news of the inventory misstatement, Big Time experienced financial difficulties and 
entered bankruptcy.  As a result, Big Time was unable to repay its loan to the bank (plaintiff). We 
focus on testing of the physical inventory (as opposed to the obsolescence reserve) because it is widely 
considered a low risk area where auditors routinely rely on the IAF to achieve audit efficiencies 
especially in multiple location settings (PCAOB 2007a; AICPA 2014; IFAC 2013; CPAC 2013).   
To enhance external validity and following Kadous (2000, 2001), the flow of the case conforms 
to the natural order of testimony and the structural features of actual jury trials.  Specifically, it presents 
the plaintiff’s opening statement, an independent audit partner serving as an expert witness for the 
plaintiff, the cross examination of the plaintiff’s expert witness, the defense’s opening statement, an 
independent audit partner serving as an expert witness for the defense, the cross examination of the 
defense’s expert witness and closing statements by both the plaintiff and defense attorneys.  These case 
facts include the IAF reliance manipulation and reinforce the previous number of inventory locations 
manipulation.  
Independent Variables 
We employed a 2 X 2 between-subjects full-factorial design that manipulated auditors’ reliance 
on the IAF as direct assistants for audit testing (Reliance on IAF) and the number of inventory locations 
audited (Audit Locations). Reliance on IAF, is manipulated on two levels (Rely versus Not Rely).  In 
the Rely condition, the IAF acted as direct assistants to the auditors for their inventory testing 
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procedures while in the Not Rely condition, the auditors performed all inventory testing procedures 
with no help from IAF. The manipulation was presented in the key case facts and reinforced in the oral 
arguments and expert witness testimony (see Appendix B for details of the manipulation):  
Jones Auditors’ audit staff performed {did not perform} all inventory testing at the… 
warehouse – they used their own staff and did not obtain {obtained} inventory testing help 
from Big Time’s internal audit staff.  
 
The second independent variable, Audit Locations (Single versus Multiple), manipulated the number 
of warehouses where the inventory was stored and the audit procedures performed.  In the Single Audit 
Location condition, inventory was stored in one warehouse near the client’s main operations, and 55 
percent of the total inventory dollar value was audited.  In the Multiple Audit Locations condition, the 
total inventory dollar value was equally distributed among 20 warehouses in surrounding counties, 
such that each warehouse held approximately 5 percent of the total inventory value and all warehouses 
followed the same strict standard inventory management process.  The auditors tested inventory in 11 
of the 20 warehouses, which was equivalent to 55 percent of the total inventory value. The Audit 
Locations manipulation was presented in the company background information and then reinforced in 
the presentation of the litigation case: 
Big Time stored its inventory in one warehouse location {20 warehouse locations in 
surrounding counties} near its main operations.  {Each warehouse is the same size so that 
approximately 5% of the total inventory dollar value is contained in each of the 20 
warehouses}.  During their audit, Jones Auditors sampled 55% of the total dollar value of Big 
Time’s inventory for testing from the sole warehouse {for testing which approximately 
equates to inventory stored in 11 of the 20 warehouses}.  
 
Our design holds constant the proportion of inventory tested (55 percent) across the two 
conditions. We consulted with statisticians to confirm the equivalency of the misstatement probability 
in the two conditions. The inventory, inventory processes, and percentage of audited inventory value 
was the same across conditions, thus ceteris paribus, the probability of a misstatement would be equally 
distributed across the single location just as it would be across the 20 locations.  Accordingly, the 
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potential number of erroneous items/value, or the potential for a misstatement, is the same across both 
Audit Location scenarios in the context of this study. Importantly, because our participants (like jurors 
in the real-world environment), lack audit expertise or knowledge about client risk, they are ideally 
suited to provide judgments based on the facts of the case rather than the general risks (including audit 
risks) that are likely to be confounded in the natural environment (Maksymov et al. 2017).    
Experimental Instrument Design Related to Risk of Misstatement in Audit Locations 
An advantage of the approach we use to investigate our research question is the ability to 
control for effects that are normally confounded in the natural environment (Bonner 2008). In practice, 
there is diversity in operations across locations which typically results in a higher risk of misstatement 
on multi-location than single location audits. Informed by the prior literature and a panel of experts 
with group/multi-location audit expertise, we experimentally control for factors associated with 
misstatement risk across the single versus multi-location audits by incorporating the following features 
in the design (Bedard and Downey 2018). First, the misstatement risk due to location diversity (Allen 
et al. 1998) is held constant by informing all participants that each warehouse carries the same granite 
stone inventory, follows “the same strict standard inventory management process” and that warehouse 
operations are centralized and have homogenously controlled processes (i.e., consistent with a lower 
risk; Allen et al. 1998; Asare, Fitzgerald, Graham, Joe, Negangard 2013).  Second, in the multi-location 
condition inventory dollar values are evenly distributed across locations making “it is less likely that a 
material error will occur because it would have to be the aggregate of errors across many locations” 
(Allen et al. 1998 p. 6; Stewart and Kinney 2013). Third, an expert panel (senior managers, partners 
and executive directors at multinational audit firms) reviewed our case materials and confirmed that 
from an audit perspective, the risk of misstatement was equivalent across the single versus multi-audit 
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locations.11 Consistent with Stewart and Kinney (2013), some experts observed that, if any, it would 
be the single audit location condition that could be seen to have higher risk because there is a higher 
likelihood of a misstatement at a location holding the total inventory balance being material, but 
misstatement risk at each multi-location engagement is capped at 5 percent. Last, the type of inventory 
(granite stone) is bulky and relatively difficult and time consuming to transport, which minimizes the 
risk of inventory transfer fraud and obsolescence concerns in this setting. 
Dependent and Process Variables 
The primary dependent variable, Negligence, is based on jurors’ assessment of auditor 
negligence using a dichotomous choice scale. Participants assess auditors as either “guilty” or “not 
guilty” of negligence, and then provide an assessment of the degree to which the auditor is “guilty” or 
“not guilty” of negligence using a scale from 50% to 100% to prevent any internally inconsistent 
responses.  Following Hoffman, Joe, and Moser (2003) and Joe (2003), we reverse code responses on 
the “not guilty” scale (i.e., 0% “not guilty” to 50% “not guilty”) to create a continuous measure of 
assessed auditor negligence for all participants. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kadous 2000; 
Reffett 2010), we focus our analyses on the second component of the negligence assessment - the 
assessed degree of auditors’ guilt (or non-guilt).   
We evaluate several variables to test the process through which participants’ perceptions of 
misstatement likelihood, and normal auditor behavior influence their negligence assessments. Recall 
that we capture the participants’ assessment of the subjective probability that the inventory balance 
                                                             
11 Our panel consisted of two Executive Directors, three Partners, and three Senior Managers from three 
multinational audit firms. The panel received key facts about the audit (nature of the inventory, and the location 
manipulations, including that in the multiple location condition the company used a standardized inventory control 
process and the inventory value was equally distributed across the 20 locations).  The experts evaluated whether the 
two sets of location facts would result in an equivalent level of misstatement risk but did not review any of the 
litigation facts or the IAF manipulation. Several experts observed that, contrary to popular misperception, the 
multiple location environment by itself, does not result in an increased risk of material misstatement.  Rather, 
additional risk would arise from the differences in operational/control processes that are often present in the multi-
location audit environment (all of which are held constant in our experimental design).   
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was misstated after they read the company background information but before they learn that there is 
a misstatement and the litigation case facts. Participants’ subjective probability assessments, 
Misstatement Likelihood, are based on a seven-point scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = Very 
Likely in response to the question: “Based on what you have read about Big Time and its inventory 
storage, how likely do you think it is that an inventory misstatement or an inventory error could occur?” 
Consistent with studies relying on norm theory (e.g., Koonce, Miller, and Winchel 2015), we 
measure participants’ perceptions of normal behavior, in this case how “normal” it was for the auditors 
to rely on the client’s IAF given the degree of geographic dispersion of the client’s audit locations. 
Normal Auditor Behavior, was based on responses to: “Considering the facts of this case, do you agree 
that a typical auditor who is careful and competent would have made the same judgment as Jones 
Auditors about using Big Time’s internal audit department in inventory testing?” and measured on a 
seven-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree that Jones [Auditors] acted as a typical 
auditor).  
IV. Results and Analyses 
Manipulation Checks  
To test the manipulation of auditors’ reliance on the IAF, we analyze the potential participants’ 
Yes/No responses to the following question: “Did Jones Auditors use Big Time’s internal audit staff 
to help perform inventory testing?”  Of the 442 participants, 89 percent correctly reported the auditors’ 
reliance on the client’s IAF in accordance with their assigned experimental condition.  The test of the 
manipulation of the number of locations reveals that 96 percent of the potential participants correctly 
identified the number of warehouses in which inventory was stored.  Overall, 87 percent (384 
participants) passed both manipulation checks. These proportions indicate successful manipulations 
for both Reliance on IAF (χ2 = 267.7, p < 0.001) and Audit Locations (χ2 = 380.3, p < 0.001). Our 
inferences are qualitatively similar when we exclude participants who failed one or both manipulation 
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checks and we find no significant or systematic differences along the demographic dimensions or 
across any of the experimental conditions. We present analyses that includes all 442 participants. 
Susceptibility to Numerosity Heuristics Effects 
Before hypotheses testing, we validate that, on average, this study’s participants are susceptible 
to numerosity heuristic processing before exposing them to the litigation case facts and experimental 
manipulations (see Figure 3). Recall, the participants review two statistically equivalent lotteries where 
the odds of winning are identical. The only difference is the first lottery presents a lower absolute value 
numerator (1:100) than the second lottery (10:1,000). We follow the method established in prior 
research to measure numerosity effects (e.g., Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole 1995; Kirkpatrick and 
Epstein 1992; Pacini and Epstein 1999b). As presented in Table 2 Panel B, there is no statistical 
difference in the participants’ own advice to a friend on Lottery 1 versus Lottery 2 (χ2 [1, N=249] = 0.197; 
p = 0.657).  However, participants’ judgments about the typical person’s recommendation reveals a 
preference for Lottery 2 – the lottery containing a higher absolute value in the numerator (χ2 [1, N=395] = 
10.696; p = 0.001; Table 2 Panel B). These results, which follow the established measures of the 
numerosity heuristic, indicate that this study’s participants are, on average, susceptible to numerosity 
heuristic processing. Importantly, there is no difference in participants’ susceptibility to numerosity 
heuristic processing across the treatment groups, confirming that random assignment was achieved in 
the experiment (χ2 [1, N=442] = 7.50; p = 0.28; not tabulated).     
Insert Table 2 about here 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that due to generalized difficulty processing and interpreting numeric 
data and risk estimates, and susceptibility to numerosity heuristic processing, participants in the multi-
location conditions will assess a higher likelihood of inventory misstatement than participants in the 
single audit location conditions. Recall that we capture assessments of misstatement likelihood before 
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jurors learn about the defendant’s losses to prevent hindsight bias effects observed in Kadous (2000). 
Table 3 reveals that participants in the Multiple Audit Location conditions had higher assessments of 
Misstatement Likelihood than the participants in the Single Audit Location conditions (means = 3.53 
versus 2.90, respectively; t [440] = 4.83; p < 0.01).  Consistent with numerosity heuristic processing, 
participants focused on the total number of auditable units with little regard for the size of the units in 
the multiple versus single audit settings (Pelham et al. 1994).  These results that jurors perceive a higher 
likelihood of a financial statement misstatement when the number of audited locations is greater 
(ceteris paribus) provide support for H1. In addition, as we discuss later, these assessments of inventory 
misstatement risk correlate significantly with jurors’ negligence judgments. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
H2 anticipates that in the multi-location setting, jurors will assess auditors as more negligent 
when they rely on the client’s IAF for direct assistance with testing versus when they do not, but that 
auditors’ reliance would not affect participants’ assessments of auditor negligence in the single setting.  
Consistent with our predictions, Figure 4 and Table 4 present the results, which show that jurors assess 
auditors as more negligent on multi-location audits when they rely on the client’s IAF than when they 
do not. The overall ANOVA model reveals a significant interaction effect of Reliance on IAF x Audit 
Locations (F [1,438] = 6.61; p = 0.005).  The simple effects analysis indicates a significant difference (t 
[217] = 2.24; p = 0.013) in auditor negligence assessments in the Multiple Audit Location setting, where 
assessed Negligence in the Rely condition (mean = 51.73) is higher than in the Not Rely condition 
(mean = 41.23). Additionally, consistent with expectations, there is no difference in assessed 
Negligence in the Rely (mean = 39.56) versus Not Rely (mean = 46.58) conditions in the Single Audit 
Location setting (t [221] = -1.37; p = 0.170).12  Our analyses, following recommendations from 
                                                             
12 Statistical inferences are unchanged when we control for various participant perceptions of the IAF’s competence, 
objectivity, jurors’ counterfactual thoughts, whether jurors blamed the auditors or the IAF more for the audit failure, 
and that auditors rely on the client’s IAF because auditors are trying to exert less effort on the audit or reduce costs 
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Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia (2018), reveal a good visual fit between the pattern of results and 
our predicted pattern (-1, -1, -1, 3).  Analyses of the contrast and its residual also show that the contrast 
was significant (F [1,438] = 6.75, p = 0.010) while the residual was not significant (F [2,438] = 0.95, p = 
0.390; not tabulated).  Finally, we find that 78 percent of the systematic variance is explained by the 
contrast pattern (R2 = 0.78; not tabulated).  Thus, taken together, these findings support H2 and indicate 
that relying on the client’s IAF in multi-location contexts that are perceived to be higher risk can 
adversely affect auditors’ legal liability.  
Insert Figure 4 and Table 4 about here 
Mediation and Casual Path Analyses 
Our theory predicts that jurors’ assessments of the likelihood of misstatement influence their 
perceptions of normal auditor behavior and these joint and serial effects will mediate the relationship 
between the interaction of Audit Locations x Reliance on IAF and Negligence.  To investigate the 
indirect effects of Misstatement Likelihood and Normal Auditor Behavior, we apply the Hayes and 
Preacher (2014) bootstrapped mediation technique. We use 5,000 bootstrap sampling iterations of the 
data to calculate a bias-corrected 95 percent confidence interval for the indirect effect we propose, 
which yields the same inferences as Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).13 Figure 5 illustrates the 
mediation model, the path coefficients, and the confidence interval for the hypothesized indirect effect. 
Consistent with our theoretical expectations, Misstatement Likelihood and Normal Auditor Behavior 
mediate the relationship between the interaction effect of Audit Locations x Reliance on IAF on 
                                                             
as well as participant affect towards auditors (Reffett 2010; Kadous 2001). Statistical inferences are unchanged 
when we analyze the binary guilty/not guilty negligence assessment variable. Statistical inferences are also 
unchanged when we control for unequal cell sizes.  
13 As employed in Bol and Leiby (2017) and DeZoort, Wilkins, and Justice (2017), the Hayes and Preacher (2014) 
approach is a more refined and robust serial mediation analysis than earlier mediation analysis techniques (e.g., 
Baron and Kenny 1986; see Hayes 2009). We employ Process Model number six.  We also confirm that Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) of the causal path yields the same mediator and inferences. Goodness of fit statistics 
indicate that the SEM fits very well: χ2 = 1.79, p = 0.40; GFI = 0.99; AGFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.00 (see Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2013). 
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Negligence (95% CI = LL: 0.06; UL: 2.02; where the confidence interval excludes zero, which 
indicates a significant mediation).  
Recall we find support for H1 which posited that, consistent with numerosity heuristic 
processing, the number of locations influenced jurors’ perceptions of differences in misstatement 
likelihood across the two treatment groups.  To further investigate numerosity heuristic effects, the 
participants in the two multi-location treatment conditions rated the case facts that most influenced 
their judgment of auditor negligence from a list of the following four options: (a) the auditors tested 11 
locations, (b) the auditors tested 11/20 locations, (c) the auditors tested 55% of the locations, (d) other, 
please explain.  Options (a) and (b) reference the numerator – with (b) engaging a numerator/ 
denominator presentation, and option (c) presents the information in a probability/relationship format. 
We find that participants whose response  indicated that they were most influenced by focus on the 
numerosity effects [the number of locations (option a) or the number of locations tested out of the total 
(option b)] had higher auditor negligence judgments (mean = 56.19) than participants who selected 
option (c) [mean = 37.47; t [177]  = 3.696; p < .001].  Further, we find a significant correlation between 
participants who selected options (a) or (b) compared to (c), a post-treatment measure of numerosity 
heuristic effects, and participants who exhibited extreme numerosity heuristic effects in our pre-
treatment measure of this construct in the pre-experimental Lottery (r = 0.156; p = 0.037).14  We also 
find that these participants whose response indicated they were influenced by the numerator (chose 
option a or b) had judgments that showed a stronger correlation with their negligence assessments than 
the participants who selected option (c) [p < .001].15   
                                                             
14 We derive the measure of extreme numerosity heuristic effects in the pre-experiment Lottery scenario as 
participants who selected lottery option (b) as their response to both recommendation questions (i.e., “How would 
you advise Ralph…” and “How would the typical person advise Ralph…”) versus selecting any of the other options.    
15 Note that if we make the same comparison of negligence verdicts between people responding (a) or (b) to those 
who responded (c) or (d) [because (d) is also suggestive of not being influenced by the numerosity heuristic], 
participants who chose (a or b) had significantly higher negligence assessments than the remaining participants 
(t217=3.264, p=0.001). 
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Taken together, these results extend the literature by providing evidence that jurors consider 
the risk context when evaluating whether auditors’ actions conform to their expectations of normal 
behavior. Even when auditors take actions encouraged by audit regulators, factors related to the client’s 
environment can, nonetheless, influence jurors’ perceptions of how auditors should conduct the audit 
(i.e., what is normal and when reliance on the IAF is appropriate).  
Insert Figure 5 about here 
V. Conclusion and Implications 
We extend prior studies which examine whether auditor behavior that is implied by or 
consistent with audit standards can limit auditors’ legal liability. We investigate whether auditor 
actions that are explicitly encouraged by regulators can have unintended consequences due to jurors’ 
susceptibility to numerosity heuristic and norm theory cognitive processing. Our study presents 
evidence that when auditors make judgments that follow explicit encouragement from regulators, 
auditors’ decisions can actually yield the unintended consequence of increasing auditors’ litigation risk 
exposure. We explore our research question in the context of the auditor’s reliance on a client’s IAF 
for direct assistance on low risk audit tests, in single versus multi-location audit settings. Auditors’ use 
of the client’s IAF on low risk multi-location audits is specifically encouraged by the PCAOB (PCAOB 
2007a) and other regulators and, more generally, clients consistently push auditors to utilize their IAF 
(Cohn 2011).  
Consistent with our predictions informed by numerosity heuristic processing and norm theory, 
jurors’ assessments of misstatement risk and what constitutes normal auditor behavior are driven by 
the joint effects of the number of client locations and the auditor’s decision to rely on the client’s IAF. 
Even though the actual risk of misstatement was held constant (as evaluated by experts), jurors 
perceived an increased misstatement risk in the multi-location versus single location setting. 
Accordingly, they judged auditor reliance on the client’s IAF for testing as less normal behavior in the 
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multi-location setting. Further, jurors found auditors to be more negligent when they relied on the 
client’s IAF on a multi-location audit than the single location and non-reliance scenarios.  While we 
examined numerosity heuristic processing and norm theory in the multi-location context, these effects 
are likely to apply to other audit areas such as audit sampling, internal control testing and component 
audit settings. Numerosity heuristic and norm theory processing could lead jurors to judge that, even 
if sampling risk and the proportion/dollar amount of the balance tested is held constant, auditors who 
considered fewer stratification levels or attributes made less normal judgments than auditors who 
considered greater stratification levels/attributes. Thus, our findings provide evidence that, in the event 
of an audit failure, auditors can be held to a higher level of legal liability when juror’s susceptibility to 
numerosity heuristic processing influences assessments of audit negligence. Further, such auditor 
litigation risk exposure is not limited even when it is explicitly encouraged by regulators. An interesting 
aspect of our finding is that we tested auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF in the less risky scenario 
permissible under the standards. This implies that auditors could face an even higher level of legal 
liability when they elect to rely on work performed by the client’s IAF (i.e., IAF work papers) to reduce 
the amount of audit testing permitted under the standards, conditioned on audit effectiveness 
constraints.   
We advance and provide evidence of a theoretical path that describes how juror susceptibility 
to numerosity heuristic processing can influence their judgments about what is normal auditor behavior 
and this in turn increases auditors’ litigation risk.  This study also provides the first evidence on 
potential negative and unintended consequences that auditors can incur when they act consistently with 
regulators’ urgings in multi-location settings.  We focus on the specific context where regulators 
explicitly encourage auditors to adopt an audit approach that increases audit efficiency while 
maintaining audit effectiveness.  The decision of whether or not to rely on the client’s IAF on an audit 
engagement lies solely with the auditor. Yet regulators, commentators, and clients express frustration 
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at perceived auditors’ reluctance to utilize the client’s IAF more extensively.  Our theory consistent 
findings provide support that the auditors’ reluctance is a rational response to minimize litigation risk 
exposure. Future research could examine how auditors trade off the risk of increased regulatory 
scrutiny versus litigation and/or reputational risk, and the factors that can mitigate versus escalate the 
auditor’s liability when following regulatory recommendations.  
Our study offers a substantive extension of the existing literature on auditor litigation risk when 
auditors rely on the prior work of the client’s IAF (e.g., Arel, Jennings, Pany, and Reckers 2012).16 
Prior studies show that some actions taken to improve audit quality can nonetheless increase auditor 
liability (e.g., exercising due care [Kadous 2000]; using decision aids [Lowe et al. 2002]; investigating 
fraud risk [Reffett 2010], documenting audit decisions [Backof 2015], and increasing audit effort 
[Maksymov and Nelson 2017]). We show that, in some client settings, conforming to regulator 
preferences can have the unintended consequence of increased auditor liability. Our examination of 
litigation risk in a multi-location setting also responds to Asare et al.’s (2013) call for more research 
on factors that can influence auditors’ decisions about testing in multi-location audits. From the 
practitioner perspective, our findings that reliance on the client’s IAF can increase litigation exposure, 
even in low risk contexts, can bolster auditor arguments for non-reliance on the client’s IAF 
particularly when clients seek fee concessions based on the use of their IAF. Last, we provide evidence 
to standard setters of an unintended consequence that can arise from direct guidance given to 
practitioners. In addition to the client’s IAF, auditors routinely rely on/use “the work of others” (e.g., 
specialists and other third parties; PCAOB 2015) to achieve a desired balance of audit effectiveness 
                                                             
16 This study is distinct from research on auditor legal liability when work is off-shored or outsourced (e.g., 
Lyubimov, Arnold, and Sutton 2012), or the disclosure of participating auditors (e.g., Dee, Lulseged, and Zhang 
2014). We examine auditor use of the IAF, an internal client resource whereas the prior studies examine use of third-
party independent auditors or the auditor’s employees who are located overseas (Lyubimov et al. 2012). Prior 
literature finds that perceived independence can impact audit litigants (e.g., Schmidt 2012), and financial statement 
users (e.g., Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002). 
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and efficiency while managing the auditor’s business risk. Regulators might consider how their 
recommendations, deficiencies in inspection reports, and changes to audit standards, can influence 
auditors’ business risk (e.g., litigation and reputational risks). 
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Appendix A - Excerpt of the Lottery Scenario used to Measure Numerosity Heuristic Processing 
 
Imagine two lottery scenarios.  In both cases, a winning number pays $50 million. Now imagine that 
Ralph Jones, a friend of yours, thinks of all the things he could buy with the money, like a new car, 
and all he can do with the money, such as take his dream vacation. These thoughts and images make 
Ralph desperately want to win the lottery. In one of the lotteries, a single winning number is selected 
from 100 numbers. In the other, 10 winning numbers are selected from 1,000 numbers. Although you 
know the proportions are identical, you might have the feeling that it is more likely that Ralph will get 
a winning number in one lottery than in the other. 
  
Ralph asks your advice about which lottery to buy. How would you advise Ralph about which lottery, 
if either, would be more likely to produce a winning ticket? (If you cannot make a choice, select “No 
Preference” below).  
 
a) The first lottery (1 winning number in 100) 
b) The second lottery (10 winning numbers in 1,000) 
c) No Preference 
 
How do you think that the typical person would advise Ralph about which lottery, if either, they thought 
would be more likely to produce a winning ticket? (If you cannot make a choice, select “No Preference” 
below). 
 
a) The first lottery (1 winning number in 100) 
b) The second lottery (10 winning numbers in 1,000) 
c) No Preference  
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Appendix B - Excerpts of the Independent Variable Manipulations  
 
Company Background 
 
(Single Location Condition / Multiple Location Condition):  Big Time’s inventories of granite stone 
are stored in one large warehouse located (20 warehouses located in surrounding counties) near its 
main operations. This warehouse contains 100% of the total inventory dollar value.  This 
warehouse operates following one strict standard inventory management process. (Each 
warehouse is the same size so that approximately 5% of the total inventory dollar value is contained 
in each of the 20 warehouses {i.e., 100% of the total inventory dollar value is stored in all warehouses 
taken together}. All warehouses operate following the same strict standard inventory management 
process.)  
 
Litigation Case Transcript 
 
Case Introduction: 
(Single Location / Multiple Location / Rely [Not Rely] Condition):  Big Time stored its inventory in 
one warehouse location (20 warehouse locations) close to its main operations.  During their audit, 
Jones Auditors sampled 55% of the total dollar value (55% of the total dollar value) of Big Time’s 
inventory for testing (which approximately equates to inventory stored in 11 of the 20 warehouses) 
from the sole warehouse.  Jones Auditors’ audit staff did not perform [performed] all inventory 
testing at the sole warehouse (all 11 of the sampled warehouses) – they used their own staff and 
obtained [did not obtain] inventory testing help from Big Time’s internal audit staff.  
 
Expert Witness for the Plaintiff: 
(Single Location / Multiple Location / Rely [Not Rely] Condition): Considering that Big Time has one 
warehouse (many warehouses), if Jones Auditors had been more diligent and conducted the inventory 
tests with assistance [themselves without obtaining assistance] from Big Time’s internal auditors, 
they might have discovered the material misstatement in the inventory amount that was reported to 
unsuspecting investors and lenders.   
 
Expert Witness for the Defense:  
(Single Location / Multiple Location / Rely [Not Rely] Condition): Furthermore, although Big Time 
has one warehouse (many warehouses), obtaining [not obtaining] assistance from Big Time’s internal 
auditors and using the inventory testing procedures Jones Auditors selected are allowed by auditing 
standards.   
 
Plaintiff Lawyer Closing Statement:    
(Single Location / Multiple Location / Rely [Not Rely] Condition): We know that Big Time has one 
(many) inventory warehouses.  Information in their working papers indicates that Jones Auditors 
selected 55% of the inventory dollar value in the sole warehouse (inventory at 11 of the 20 
warehouses {55% of inventory dollar value}) for testing.  We also know that to perform the actual 
tests, Jones Auditors used their own staff plus obtained [and did not obtain] assistance from Big 
Time’s internal audit staff to perform testing procedures.      
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Appendix B - continued 
 
(Single Location / Multiple Location / Rely [Not Rely] Condition): Given that Big Time stores 
inventory in one warehouse (many warehouses), it is clear that Jones Auditors were negligent in 
staffing the inventory testing – they should not [they should] have obtained assistance from Big Time’s 
internal auditors.   
 
Defense Lawyer Closing Statement:     
(Single Location / Multiple Location / Rely [Not Rely] Condition): Auditing standards allow the 
external auditors to perform testing with [without] assistance from the client’s internal auditors even 
if the client stores inventory in one location (many locations).   
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Figure 1 Hypothesized Model of Juror Judgment 
 
 
 
Variable Definition:  
- Number of Audit Locations x Internal Audit Function Reliance = The interaction of the Audit Location and the 
Reliance on IAF conditions. 
- Likelihood of Misstatement Assessment = Participant assessment of the risk of misstatement given the number 
of inventory locations. 
- Normal (Typical) Auditor Behavior Assessment = Participant perceptions of the IAF reliance decision the typical 
auditor would make.   
- Auditor Negligence Assessment = Participant assessment of auditor negligence. 
- H1: Ceteris paribus, jurors will assess an increased likelihood of an account misstatement when the audit client 
is a multi-location engagement than when the audit client is a single location engagement. 
- H2: Jurors assessments of auditors’ negligence will differ when auditors rely versus do not rely on the client’s 
IAF on multi-location audits but not on single location audits. Further, in a multi-location audit setting, auditors 
who rely on the client’s IAF will be judged as more negligent than auditors who do not rely on the client’s IAF. 
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Figure 2 Hypothesized Pattern of Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligencea (H2) 
 
 
aFigure 2 presents the predicted pattern of effects based on the following hypothesis: 
Auditors will be assessed as more negligent when they rely on the client’s IAF in a multiple location audit setting than 
when they do not; however, IAF reliance will have no effect on auditor negligence assessments in a single location 
audit setting 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Definition:  
- Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence = Assessment of auditor negligence is presented as a continuous scale 
such that the 0 represents “100% completely not guilty” and 100 represents “100% completely guilty.” 
- Reliance on IAF = Auditors in the Rely (Not Rely) condition relied on the client’s internal audit function for 
direct assistance with inventory audit testing. 
- Audit Location(s) = In the Single Location (Multiple) Location condition, there is (are) one (20) auditable 
inventory location(s).  
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Figure 3 Sequence of Experimental Procedures 
 
  
Numerosity Heuristic Pre-test 
• Lottery scenario and questions 
Participant Qualification Pre-screening 
• Juror eligibility and logic questions 
Company Preliminary Information 
• Information about the company (including Audit Locations 
manipulation)  
• Inventory Misstatement Likelihood assessment (H1) 
• Information on the internal audit function and auditing standards 
governing external auditor reliance 
• Two questions to verify understanding 
Auditing Education 
• Information on external auditors, the audit process, audit reports and 
reasonable assurance.   
• Two questions to verify understanding  
Financial Reporting Education 
• Information about financial statements and what they are used for.  
• Two questions to verify understanding 
Auditor Litigation Case 
• Identification of case parties: Bank (plaintiff) v. Auditor (defendant) 
• Facts of the case (e.g., clean audit opinion, inventory overstated) 
• Audit Locations and Reliance on Internal Audit manipulations 
• Plaintiff opening statement 
• Expert witness for the plaintiff and cross-examination (includes both 
manipulations) 
• Cross-examination of expert witness 
• Defense opening statement  
• Expert witness for the defense and cross-examination (includes both 
manipulations) 
• Plaintiff closing statements (includes both manipulations) 
• Defense closing statements (includes both manipulations) 
• Instructions to the jury 
Participant Responses 
• Standard of negligence description to jury 
• Assessment of auditor Negligence, and process measures e.g., normal 
audit behavior (H2) 
• Manipulation checks and post experimental questions 
• Demographic questions 
Exit study if not jury eligible or if responses incorrect 
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Figure 4 Experimental Results of Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence 
   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Definition:  
- Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence = Assessment of auditor negligence is presented as a continuous scale 
such that the 0 represents “100% completely not guilty” and 100 represents “100% completely guilty.” 
- Reliance on IAF = Auditors in the Rely (Not Rely) condition relied on the client’s internal audit function for 
direct assistance with inventory audit testing. 
- Audit Location(s) = In the Single Location (Multiple) Location condition, there is (are) one (20) auditable 
inventory location(s). 
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Figure 5 Model of the Indirect Effects of Mediating Variables on Auditor Negligence 
Assessments 
 
 
 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the .05, .01 and .001 levels (all p-values are one-tailed). 
 
Indirect effect of Audit Locations x Reliance on IAF on Auditor Negligence through 
Misstatement Likelihood and Normal Auditor Behavior 
 Effect SE 
(boot) 
95% CI 
(Lower Limit) 
95% CI 
(Upper Limit) 
Interaction of the Audit Locations and 
Reliance on IAF  0.72 0.48 0.06 2.02 
 
Note: Results using a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval with 5,000 bootstrap re-samples. See Hayes and 
Preacher (2014) and Hayes (2013) for overviews of this mediation test method. 
 
Variable Definition:  
- Number of Audit Locations x Internal Audit Function Reliance = The interaction of the Audit Locations and the 
Reliance on IAF conditions. 
- Likelihood of Misstatement Assessment = Participant rating response to the question: “Based on what you have 
read about Big Time and its inventory storage, how likely do you think it is that an inventory misstatement or an 
inventory error could occur?” Responses are based on seven-point anchored scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 
7 = Very Likely. 
- Normal (Typical) Auditor Behavior Assessment = Participant rating response to the question: “Considering the 
facts of this case, do you agree that a typical auditor who is careful and competent would have made the same 
judgment as Jones Auditors about using Big Time’s internal audit department in inventory testing?  Responses 
are based on seven-point anchored scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree. 
- Auditor Negligence Assessment = Assessment of auditor negligence is presented as a continuous scale such that 
the 0 represents “100% completely not guilty” and 100 represents “100% completely guilty.” 
(X)
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45 
 
TABLE 1 
Participant Demographics 
n=442 
 
 
Demographic Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Age (range 18 to 72 years) 35.9 
(11.9) 
Gender: Male  49.3% 
Highest Level of Education: 
- High School Diploma / GED 
- Trade / Professional School 
- Associates Degree 
- Bachelor’s Degree 
- Master’s Degree 
- Doctorate Degree 
- None of the above 
 
23.0% 
4.8% 
18.1% 
40.7% 
10.4% 
  2.5% 
  0.5% 
Percentage of Participants with past experience as: 
- Inventory Specialist  
- Investor 
 
1.8% 
17.6% 
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TABLE 2 
Lottery Choice Pre-Test 
Descriptive Statistics and Results 
 
Panel A: Frequency of Lottery Option Selection (Proportion of the Total) 
 
 Personal Advice to Friend Typical Person’s Advice to 
Friend 
Lottery 1 (1:100) 121 (27.4%) 165 (37.3%) 
Lottery 2 (10:1,000) 128 (29.0%) 230 (52.0%) 
No Preference 193 (43.6%) 47 (10.7%) 
Total 442 (100%) 442 (100%) 
 
Panel B: Chi-Square Test Results for Lottery Selection 
Factor Lottery 1 
(1:100) 
Lottery 2 
(10:1,000) 
df χ2 
Value 
p-valuea 
Personal Advice to Friend 121 128 1 0.197 0.657 
Typical Person’s Advice to Friend 165 230 1 10.696 0.001 
 
a p-value is two-tailed 
 
Variable Definitions: 
- Personal Advice to Friend = Participant response to the question: “How would YOU advise Ralph about which 
lottery, if either, would be more likely to produce a winning ticket?” 
- Typical Person’s Advice to Friend = Participant response to the question: “How do you think the typical person 
would advise Ralph about which lottery, if either, would be more likely to produce a winning ticket?” 
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TABLE 3 
Perception of the Likelihood of Misstatement  
Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis 1 Tests 
 Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of participants] 
 
 Single Location 
Condition 
Multiple Location 
Condition 
df t-value p-valuea 
Likelihood of 
Misstatement 
2.90 
(1.39) 
[223] 
3.53 
(1.35) 
[219] 
440 4.83 < 0.01 
a p-value is two-tailed 
 
Variable Definitions: 
- Likelihood of Misstatement = Participant response to the question: “Based on what you have read about Big Time 
and its inventory storage, how likely do you think it is that an inventory misstatement or an inventory error could 
occur?”  Responses based on seven-point anchored scale where 1 = Very Unlikely, and 7 = Very Likely. 
- Audit Location(s) = In the Single Location (Multiple) Location condition, there is (are) one (20) auditable 
inventory location(s). 
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TABLE 4 
Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence 
Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis 2 Tests 
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [Number of Participants]   
 Rely on IAF Not Rely on IAF Total 
Single Audit Location 39.36 
(32.52) 
[110] 
45.58 
(34.80) 
[113] 
42.51 
(33.76) 
[223] 
Multiple Audit 
Locations 
51.73 
(34.67) 
[113] 
41.23 
(34.45) 
[106] 
46.64 
(34.88) 
[219] 
Total 45.63 
(34.12) 
[223] 
43.47 
(34.62) 
[219] 
44.56 
(34.35) 
[442] 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence 
Factor 
df 
Type III  
Sum of Squares F-value p-valuea 
Reliance on IAF  1 507.51 0.43 0.255 
Audit Locations 1 1772.63 1.52 0.109 
Reliance on IAF*Audit Locations 1 7709.03 6.61 0.005 
Error 438 1165.00   
a p values are one-tailed 
 
Panel C: Results for Simple Effects of Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence 
Factor Rely on IAF Not Rely on IAF t-value p-value 
Single Audit Location 39.36 
(32.52) 
45.58 
(34.80) 
-1.37 0.170a 
Multiple Audit Locations 51.73 
(34.67) 
41.23 
(34.45) 
2.24 0.013b 
a p values are two-tailed 
b p values are one-tailed 
 
Variable Definitions: 
- Juror Assessment of Auditor Negligence = Assessment of auditor negligence is presented as a continuous scale 
such that the 0 represents “100% completely not guilty” and 100 represents “100% completely guilty.” 
- Reliance on IAF = Auditors in the Rely (Not Rely) condition relied on the client’s internal audit function for 
direct assistance with inventory audit testing. 
- Audit Location(s) = In the Single Location (Multiple) Location condition, there is (are) one (20) auditable 
inventory location(s). 
 
 
